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On 1 March 2008 Danish Demining Group (DDG) entered into a two-year agreement with the 
Swedish International Development Agency (Sida)1 to implement the project “Survey, 
Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) and Mine Risk Education in Southern Sudan”.  The project 
aims to support the repatriation process for refugees and IDPs in South Sudan by providing a 
safe environment for the returnees and communities, and facilitating the work of 
humanitarian organisations. As the project is scheduled to end in 2010, Sida and DDG decided 
to commission an evaluation to inform the decision concerning a possible extension. The 
evaluation was conducted by a team fielded by the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in the period February-March 2010. 
 
DDG is one of a number of mine action operators working in South Sudan to address the 
explosives contamination left from decades of civil war. The mine action programme has been 
operating in parts of Sudan since 2002 and, since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
in early 2005, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) has had the responsibility of planning, 
coordination and regulation. The Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Government of 
South Sudan (GoSS) have also established national mine action authorities in Khartoum and 
Juba respectively. The latter – the South Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC) – is scheduled to 
assume overall responsibility for mine action in the South when the UNMAO mandate ends in 
July 2011.  
 
South Sudan poses many challenges for mine action operators: vast distances, poor 
infrastructure, and continued insecurity. In addition, there remains a great deal of uncertainty 
whether the political milestones specified in the CPA (national elections in mid-April 2010 and 
a referendum on independence for South Sudan in January 2011) will go forward as planned, 
and whether they could spark renewed conflict. 
 
Under the leadership of UNMAO, the mine action sector has formulated a Multi-Year Plan. This 
provides a good outline of the plans until mid-2011, but little clarity on the GoSS vision for 
mine action in South Sudan once it assumes responsibility for the sector after that date. These 
many uncertainties greatly complicate the task of future planning for DDG. 
 
DDG began operations in 2006 to facilitate the return of refugees, mainly in the returnee 
corridors of Central and Eastern Equatoria. It has adopted a community-centred approach, 
with priorities defined in a participatory manner; a contrast in South Sudan, where most mine 
action activities are under UNMAO ‘command and control’. In 2008, DDG formulated a 
Strategic Planning Document. In line with the objectives of the Sida-funded project, the vision 
statement in the strategy highlighted the needs of returnees. The overall objective was 
broader: “Creating an environment free of the threat of landmines and ERW, where people can 
live safely and have access to land and natural resources.” The strategy also outlined six 
specific objectives, which are summarised below. 
                                                          
1 
In addition to Sida, DDG has received funding from UNHCR, the Netherlands, Canada, Austria and ECHO. 
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1. An expansion of the operational area. 2. Investigate the feasibility of SALW activities. 
3. Improve HR management.  4. Strengthen policy and programme 
development  
5. Strengthen ties to SSDC and potential 
national NGO partners.  
6. Cooperation with Danish Refugee Council 
(DRC – DDG’s parent organisation) in Sudan 
 
DDG provides a range of mine action services – survey and marking; explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD); Community Liaison; mine risk education (MRE) – and is in the process of 
implementing an ‘impact monitoring’ system to document development outcomes. Its recent 
operations have focused on Magwi county in Eastern Equatoria, where is has about 75 field 
personnel working out of two camps. It has been giving increased attention to capacity 
development, both for its own national staff and for personnel from SSDC and the Sudan 
Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS – a local NGO). To date, capacity development efforts 
have focused on technical and supervisory skills of individuals rather than the development of 
broader organisational capabilities in national mine action organisations. 
 
The evaluation team was asked to use the standard criteria2 used in development evaluation 
to assess the plans, operations and achievements of DDG, and arrived at the following 
principal conclusions: 
 
Relevance – DDG’s choice of geographic areas, services to deliver and community-centred 
delivery strategy are all relevant to the needs in South Sudan, and has been a useful 
complement to the efforts of other mine action organisations. Its focus on returnees was 
relevant in 2008, but is less so today as the flows of returnees has abated. 
 
Efficiency – Overall, DDG has implemented the project well and has achieved, in whole of in 
large part, its output targets. However, efficiency could be improved, particularly in the 
delivery of MRE and via better training and support of its network of community volunteers. 
 
Effectiveness – DDG has been effective in reducing risks to returnees, other community 
members, and staff from humanitarian and development organisations working in those same 
communities, although a more rigorous assessment of how significant the risk reduction has 
been would need the type of data collected through the impact monitoring process, which is 
not yet fully in place. DDG has also been effective in enhancing supervisory and technical skills 
of South Sudanese working for it, SSDC, and SIMAS, but has not yet initiated more ambitious 
organisational development efforts. It has made partial progress in promoting gender, but 
little with respect to the second key cross-cutting issue – HIV/AIDS. 
 
Sustainability – This was framed mainly in the context of exit and transition planning. DDG 
does not have clear plans in place for the transition of activities to a national organisation and 
its own eventual exit (at least from the direct delivery of its current set of mine action 
activities). Admittedly, South Sudan at this juncture raises enormous challenges for mid- to 
long-term planning, and UNMAO and SSDC have not yet formulated a clear vision for the mine 
action sector after July-2011, which would provide DDG with at least a strategic framework to 
build upon. The formulation of contingency plans probably represents the most viable way 
forward. 
                                                          
2
 The evaluation did not call for an assessment of impact, which would have been impossible given the absence of 
baseline data, coupled with time and resource constraints. 
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In addition, the evaluation team was asked to assess the DDG project using two additional 
criteria: coverage and coordination. 
 
Coverage – The team found no exclusion based on ethnicity and no serious exclusions based 
on gender.3 However, MRE training does not reach the disabled.4                                                                                                                   
 
Coordination – DDG coordinates well with other mine action organisations in South Sudan, and 
its relationships with donors, national authorities and UN agencies appear well established and 
constructive. To date, it has not done enough to communicate and build links with civil society 
organisations (CSO) and non-mine action NGOs. 
 




1. Revise its strategic plan to incorporate: 
 a focus on community security and development needs rather than the safe return of 
refugees 
 contingency plans or strategic options regarding transition/exit, each based on a 
potential scenario and depending on the outcomes of, at least: 
o the national election 
o the referendum on self-determination for South Sudan 
o the ending or prolongation of the UNMAO mandate in the South 
 a more ambitious plan to support the development of national capacities, going 
beyond individual capacities to include functional capabilities of partner organisations 
(e.g. quality management; financial management) or the national programme (e.g. 
national monitoring and evaluation systems) 
 options for enhancing its cost-effectiveness, which could entail 
o reducing the number of expatriate staff, or  
o achieving scale economies by broadening the geographic area of operations or 
scope economies by adding new services, such as SALW management for 
community security 
 
2. Fully implement its plans for monitoring and reporting on the developmental outcomes 
stemming, in whole or in part, from its services (i.e. baseline and post-completion 
monitoring surveys). 
 
3. Strengthen its coordination with development agencies working in the same geographic 
areas. 
 
4. Address cross-cutting issues more thoroughly; in particular, gender & diversity, plus 
HIV/AIDS. 
 
5. Strengthen its MRE services by: 
                                                          
3
 The timing for MRE sessions may not be appropriate to women and should be assessed.    
4
 The evaluation team did not observe MRE sessions targeted for children during the mission, nor see training 
materials appropriate for children. DDG has since confirmed that they do have MRE materials for children, and do 
deliver sessions aimed at children. 
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 dividing participants into smaller groups based on age and gender, and building more 
role play into the training, particularly for groups with lower literacy 
 developing the MRE volunteer resource more effectively by thorough vetting of 
potential volunteers, a comprehensive training process, and regular monitoring and 
evaluation of volunteer activities 
 expanding the number of MRE sessions held in a day and the number of communities 




1. Maintain funding to DDG, assuming its project proposal adequately addresses the 
recommendations listed above, including the incorporation of a transition and exit 
strategy, at least with respect to the delivery of the existing range of MRE and EOD 
services. 
 
2. Work with other mine action donors to encourage UNMAO and SSDC to update the Multi-
Year Plan for the Mine Action Programme, which should incorporate clear statements on: 
 
 the projected extent and impact of the contamination that will remain as of mid-2011 
(i.e. the needs assessment) 
 the capacities that will be required to address the threat remaining after mid-2011, 
and  
 the GoSS vision and strategy for how those capacities will be financed and delivered, 
including the capacities required for: 
o making policy and strategy 
o operational planning and coordination 
o delivery of mine action services 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Rationale, Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation 
On 1 March 2008 Danish Demining Group (DDG) entered into a two-year agreement with the 
Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) to implement the project “Survey, Explosive 
Ordinance Disposal (EOD) and Mine Risk Education in Southern Sudan”.  The Sida financed 
project period is ending in 2010 and Sida and DDG have discussed the possibility of a 
continuation of the project. The two parties decided to commission an evaluation to inform 
the extension decision. The purposes of the evaluation are to (i) inform decisions regarding the 
possible continuation of the project and (ii) contribute to enhanced project performance. The 
primary audiences are the Sida officials and DDG managers responsible for this project, plus 
the Policy Unit within the Danish Refugee Council. 
 
The principal objectives are to: 
1. Ascertain results (outcomes and outputs) and 
2. Assess the project in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and relevance.5  
 
In addition, the evaluation report will feed-into a broader evaluation of Sida’s overall support 
to mine action from 2001 to 2009. 
Methodology 
The evaluation featured (i) meetings with headquarters personnel in both Sida and DDG/DRC, 
(ii) review of documents and data (e.g. LIS findings), and (iii) a field mission to South Sudan. 
The following activities were undertaken during the field mission: 
 Meetings with the DDG project management team 
 Site visits to observe the EOD/BAC teams and to meet with team leaders 
 Community visits to observe the MRE and Community Liaison (CL) teams, meet team 
leaders, and with community leaders and members to discuss their perceptions of the 
impact of mines/ERW and the benefits stemming from DDG outputs (MRE sessions; CL 
visits; EOD survey & clearance) 
 Review of operational planning and monitoring documents 
 Meetings with representatives from: 
o Other mine action organisations (SSDC, UNMAO, NPA). 
o Agencies involved with refugee/IDP returns, community development, community 
security etc. 
o UN agencies and international NGOs involved with refugee/IDP returns, 
community development, community security etc. 
o Members of the Joint Donor Team Office. 
  
The strategy for the evaluation was to apply multiple methods in the form of semi-structured 
interviews with project personnel, government officials, and experts from mine action and 
other fields; observation; record review; review of secondary data; and participatory tools with 
community members to obtain sufficient quantitative and qualitative data for triangulation 
and for reliable conclusions to be drawn concerning the evaluation questions. 
 
                                                          
5 In addition, the evaluation will assess the project against the following criteria: institutional and financial 
sustainability of the support provided to the project; coverage; and coordination. 
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The evaluation was managed by Ted Paterson, Head of Evaluation and Policy Research at the 
GICHD.  The evaluation team consisted of Tim Lardner (mine action expert), Anna Woods 
(livelihoods specialist) and Kennet Korayi (South Sudanese national with significant evaluation 
experience). The field mission took place 15-26 February 2010.  The programme for the field 
mission is shown at Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Itinerary of the field mission 
 Tim Lardner Anna Wood & Kennet Korayi 
Tues. 16 Feb - Arrival & initial briefings with DDG team - Arrival & initial briefings with DDG team 
Wed. 17 Feb - DDG operations brief  
- Meeting with UNHCR 
- Field visit to BAC site (Ganzi)  
- Discussions with operational teams Ganzi.  
- Overnight in field camp 
- DDG operations brief  
- Meeting with UNHCR 
- Field visit to BAC site (Ganzi)  
- Meetings and interviews with Boma 
representative, chief and community 
members  
- Visit to Ganzi vocational skills centre 
Thurs. 18 
Feb 
- Visit Kulipapa BAC site & view operations 
- Travel to NPA base camp Yei to view 
training course & meet stakeholders 
- Visit MRE field activities, meeting with 
MRE team and MRE training participants 
- Complete field visit & return to Juba  
Fri 19 Feb - Meetings with NPA, DDG in Yei 
- Return to Juba and team meeting 
- Meetings with in Juba with JRS , CRS, 
ADRA, GTZ, DED, and DDG Team (Juba) 
Sat 20 Feb - Document review & team discussions in 
Juba 
- Document review & team discussions in 
Juba 
Sun 21 Feb - Document review, team discussions and 
discussions with DDG in Juba 
- Travel to Kit field base 
Mon 22 Feb - Meeting with SSDC 
- Meeting with UNMAO 
- Travel to Mundri 
- Field visit to Magwi (town) 
- Interviews held with Payam 
Administrator, MRE volunteer, Deputy 
Head, Head and pupils in Magwi Secondary 
School and Primary School, 
SSRRC Coordinator and RDS representative 
(local radio station and information centre)  
- Field representatives from GTZ and DED 
were not available 
Tues 23 Feb - Field visit to operations site in Mundri 
- Return to Juba 
- Field visit to Pageri, Loa & return to Kit  
- Interviews with local community 
representatives including chief and sub 
chiefs, MRE volunteer and local residents. 
Wed 24 Feb - Team meeting and report preparation - Return to Juba, follow-up meetings and 
report preparation 
Thurs 25 Feb  - Debriefing & departure (16:45 to Nairobi) 
- Meeting with Klaus Ljørring Pedersen, 
Nairobi 
- Debriefing & departure (16:45 to Nairobi) 
- Meeting with Klaus Ljørring Pedersen in 
Nairobi 
Fri 26 Feb - Nairobi-Oslo - Nairobi-Geneva 
Problems encountered/limitations 
As is common in the immediate post-conflict period following extended conflicts, we expected 
little accurate baseline data. Data limitations are a constraint to a full understanding and make 
it difficult to arrive at rigorous assessments concerning efficiency and effectiveness. In 
addition, the original plan was for Vera Bohle, Senior Evaluation Expert at the GICHD, to serve 
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as evaluation team leader. At the last moment, a medical problem prevented her from 
travelling and Tim Lardner was recruited to undertake the mission. Given the short notice, the 
team leader was unable to take part in the planning and preparatory phases of the evaluation.  
Content of the report 
The evaluation report (i) documents achievements, experiences and lessons arising from the 
project, (ii) provides the team’s conclusions concerning the evaluation questions,6 and (iii) 
provides recommendations regarding possible future project strategies and approaches. 
                                                          
6
 The Evaluation Matrix in Appendix 2 details the evaluation questions and sub-questions; the nature of the 
question and the relevant criterion; possible performance indicators; likely sources of data; and the data collection 
methods. 
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2.  CONTEXT 
Conflict and political development 
Sudan has been embroiled in civil wars for much of the period since its independence in 1956. 
The latest North/South conflict started in 1983 and resulted in at least 2 million deaths and 4 
million people displaced. At the beginning of 2009, UNHCR estimated that 419,000 refugees 
were still living in exile and there were 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). 7 
 
This conflict ended formally in January 2005 with the signature of a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the main rebel group, the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A). The peace agreement created the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), which 
represented the ten southern regions. The country then entered a six year interim period, due 
to end in 2011, when a referendum is scheduled on the self-determination of the south. 
 
Despite the CPA, risks of political or violent conflicts in South Sudan remain high. The 
consequences of the planned 2011 referendum remain uncertain, while the CPA has suffered 
from a lack of implementation by both parties. The GNU is embroiled in conflicts in Darfur and 
East Sudan, while several thousand people died in 2009 due to tribal conflicts in South Sudan, 
especially in Jonglei state. The underdevelopment of the region remains a source of tension.   
Nature of the contamination 
As of June 2009, a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) has been completed in 16 states.8 The UN 
Mine Action Office (UNMAO) estimates total contamination of 107 km2. However, systematic 
casualty data collection does not exist. The LIS in Central and Western Equatoria identified 93 
mine-impacted communities (77 in Central Equatoria). Approximately 1,252,372 residents 
were affected, and the communities were the place of origin for almost 295,000 IDP. Over 70% 
of the impacted communities reported blocked access to agriculture land and housing. In 
addition, 50 communities in Central Equatoria and 19 in Western Equatoria requested UXO 
spot clearance in 128 locations. The LIS results are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2 - LIS results for Sudan  
 
 
                                                          
7 2010 UNHCR country operations profile – Sudan, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483b76.html, accessed 
26 March 2010 
8 In the states where DDG is working (Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria), the LIS was completed in 2006-08. 
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In Eastern Equatoria, 43 communities were identified as impacted by landmines, with the 
counties of Torit, Magwi and Kapoeta South most affected. Those 43 communities represented 
a population of 83,087 people and an estimated 53,000 IDPs. As well, the LIS highlighted the 
amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO) littered across Eastern Equatoria, with 93 areas in 48 
communities having UXO spot clearance requirements. 
International Engagement 
In March 2005 – following the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) undertaken by the World Bank 
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – the governments of Sudan and 
South Sudan, released the Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty 
Eradication. This presented the causes of the conflict and under-development, and strategies 
for reconstruction and development. Those strategies highlighted the need for: better access 
to water and sanitation; developing physical infrastructure; prioritizing agriculture; promoting 
private sector development; human rights; and the return of refugees/ IDPs. 
 
Based on the needs identified by the JAM, two multi-sectoral Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) 
were established, one national and the other for South Sudan. The purpose of South Sudan 
MDTF was to coordinate donor support for reconstruction and development. However, a mid-
term evaluation commissioned by NORAD in 2009 showed that: “The World Bank-managed 
MDTF was expected to be used as a single aid instrument, allowing for strong donor 
coordination and alignment. But by 2007, almost half of the partners’ development assistance 
was taking place outside the Fund, either on bilateral programmes (26%) or through other UN 
pooled funds (19%)”.9  
 
On 24 March 2005, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established by the 
Security Council resolution 1590 (2005). Among other tasks, UNMIS was to: support 
implementation of the CPA; facilitate and coordinate, within its areas of deployment, the 
voluntary return of refugees/IDPs and the delivery of humanitarian assistance; assist the 
parties in the mine action sector; and contribute towards international efforts to protect and 
promote human rights. 
Sida funding 
Sweden and a number of other donors created the Joint Donor Team (JDT – comprising 
Sweden, Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom) to encourage 
donor coordination, support the MDTFs and manage programmes which cannot be 
implemented by the MDTF. But the evaluation of the JDT showed that “Programme 
management outside MDTF has remained bilateral, with JDT only having responsibility over 
two small funds, the Technical Assistance Fund and the Small Scale Fund”.10 
 
More recently, Sida formulated its strategy for development cooperation in Sudan for 2008-
2011, featuring: peaceful development; respect for human rights; democratic governance; and 
lasting reconciliation and national unity within Sudan. During this period, total Swedish 
assistance is expected to amount to EUR 95.8 million, excluding humanitarian support.   
 
                                                          
9 Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan, Executive Summary, 2009, NORAD - Evaluation 
Department, http://www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+Page?key=125142  
accessed 23 March 2010 
10 Ibid. 
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Sida has provided support to DDG of around 16.5 million SEK in 2008 and 2009.  This funding 
has been earmarked to the support of operational, personnel and support costs, which often 
are split proportionately with other donors.  For example, Sida funds 75% of the Programme 
Manager’s position, 25% of the Operations Manager’s position, 33% of the (originally three – 
now two) Survey/EOD technical advisors and a similar proportion of regionally recruited 
positions. 
 
In 2008, Sida funds supported Survey/EOD Teams, MRE Teams, an EOD TA and the Operations 
Manager in addition to the Administration/Finance manager and a full range of support 
services. The full 2009 budget proposed to, and agreed by, Sida is at Appendix 3 – 2009 SIDA 
budget. 
 
Although this report considers the DDG programme as a whole, because of the way that DDG 
use donor funds within the programme (i.e. spread among elements although often specific 
teams are ostensibly funded by individual donors), the bulk of the report applies to the entire 
programme rather than just those components financed by the Sida contribution.11 
Future outlook 
A number of critical events are scheduled for the next 18 months, which almost ensure that 
the period will be turbulent. A national election is scheduled for 11-13 April, and indications 
are that the result will be viewed as illegitimate by many in Sudan and internationally.12 A 
referendum on self-determination in the South is slated to follow in January 2011. If the South 
votes for independence – as is widely expected – then the CPA provides for an interim period 
until July 2011, at which time the existing UNMIS mandate will expire. If the referendum is 
delayed by the GNU in Khartoum, then the SPLM may opt to declare independence 
unilaterally.  These are all potential flash points that could ignite the renewal of widespread 
violent conflict. 
 
In summary, South Sudan represents a complex and difficult environment. The difficulty in 
operating in areas plagued by continuing instability, and where governments lack the capacity 
or commitment to exercise leadership in reconciliation and development, are not to be 
underestimated. A history of uncertainty, a lack of infrastructure and a population with a low 
degree of education all constrain rapid and effective development. In addition, it is only 
beginning to become clear to what extent the mine and UXO threat is affecting the population 
of Sudan. Finally, the coming year promises to be turbulent and fraught with risks. 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Throughout 2009, other donors (the Netherlands and DFAIT Canada) have supported the programme with a 
mixture of operational, personnel and support costs.  
12
 See, for but the latest of many analyses, International Crisis Group, Rigged Elections in Darfur and the 
Consequences of a Probable NCP Victory in Sudan, Africa Briefing Nº72, March 2010. 
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3.  FINDINGS  
The Mine Action Programme in Sudan 
International Response 
Mine action was an important point of entry for the international community’s efforts to 
promote peace in Sudan. An Emergency Mine Action Programme was launched in 2002 
through an MoU between the United Nations, the GoS and the SPLA. Emergency operations 
started in the Nuba Mountains using international and national NGOs for demining and mine 
risk education (MRE) to support the Joint Monitoring Commission. In parallel, the UN 
supported dialogue between the North and South through a “Cross-Line Support initiative”. 
Since then, more than 44 km2 of land have been released and a further 29,000 km of road 
verified nationwide.  
 
The UN currently provides technical and financial assistance through the United Nations Mine 
Action Office (UNMAO), which was mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1590 and the 
CPA to coordinate, facilitate, accredit, and conduct quality assurance of all mine action 
activities in Sudan. Following the January 2008 establishment of the UN-African Union Hybrid 
operation in Darfur (UNAMID), UNMAO initiated operations in Darfur region.  
 
UNMAO has established Centres in Khartoum in the north and Juba in the south. In the south, 
despite the size of affected areas and difficult environment, there have been significant 
achievements. At a press conference in January 2010, the director of UNMAS said: “By the 
same deadline [June 2011], 849 dangerous areas would have been cleared in addition to the 
587 dangerous areas that had been opened up since October 2009, of 1,436 recorded ones.” 
 
UNMAO lists five national priorities: 
 
 Opening of primary and secondary routes  Mine Risk Education 
 Survey, Marking and Clearance  Capacity Building 
 Victim Assistance  
 
The UNMAO Mine Action Centre in Juba coordinates mine action in the south and additionally 
provides support to the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan, UNMIS (which includes a number 
of demining units from troop-contributing countries).  
 
In addition, a number of international demining NGOs and firms have initiated operations in 
Sudan – primarily in the South. The firms work on commercial contracts issued by UNMAO, 
financed by (i) Assessed Budgets for the UNMIS and UNAMID peacekeeping missions, plus the 
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action.13 Some INGOs also work on contracts from 
UNMAO, but most depend on donor support. 
 
For a number of years, the mine action programme in Sudan has been one of the largest in the 
world, with international funding in the range of $70-$80 million per annum. 
                                                          
13
 Formally, contracts are issued by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS). 
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Government of Sudan Response 
Following the 2002 MoU establishing the Emergency Mine Action Programme, the GoS 
established a National Mine Action Office in Khartoum while the SPLM established the New 
Sudan Mine Action Directorate in Rumbek and Nairobi (later relocated to Juba).14 With the 
signing of the CPA, two national mine action centres were established – the National Mine 
Action Centre (NMAC) in the North, and the South Sudan Demining Authority/Commission 
(SSDA/C) in the South. Later on in December 2005, the Government of National Unity 
established the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) through a presidential decree.15 With 
support from UNDP, the authorities in the North and the South have also established field 
offices in Kassala, Malakal, and Wau, with plans to set up new offices in Kadugli and Ed 
Damazin in 2009. 
 
In the South, the SSDA/C is scheduled to take over the mine action coordination role from 
UNMAO in June 2011. According to its Strategic Plan for 2009-2011, the SSDC/A vision is: a 
society free from threats, effects and impacts of landmines and ERW and its six priorities are:  
 Coordination and Regulation of Mine Action 
 Capacity Building 
 Information, Communication and Education 
 Landmines Victim/Survivor Assistance 
 Resource Mobilization, and  
 Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
SSDA/C has a staff complement in the range of 100 persons. 
Future plans 
In 2009, the Mine Action Sector16 came together to formulate a Multi-Year Plan (MYP). This 
covers the period to 2014, outlining two distinct phases for the mine action programme, 
largely due to impending political developments:17  
  
 Phase 1: January 2009 – June 2011 (to the end of the existing UNMIS mandate) 
 Phase 2: July 2011 – April 2014 
 
The MYP states: “The transition will be undertaken in three stages: capacity development; 
joint activities; and full national ownership by 2011, dependent on the extension of the UNMIS 
mandate. UNMAO will implement an exit strategy while placing key national and international 
staff among national authorities’ technical advisors.” Key activities focus around on-the-job 
training for staff from the two authorities to support their planning, coordinating and quality 
assurance capacities. 
 
The MYP is a useful document, but it is clear that it reflects the consensus among key actors, 
who did not use the planning process to press for decisions on controversial issues.18 Further 
                                                          
14
 Sudan ratified the Ottawa Convention in October 2003. 
15
 The NMAA includes a National Mine Action Committee; a General Secretariat; the NMAC; and the SSDC/A. 
16
 This comprises international and national NGOs, mine action firms, UN military demining units, and ‘Joint 
Integrated Demining Units’ (JIDU – made-up of troops from both the North and South), as well as UNMAO, NMAA, 
SSDA/A 
17
 The current UNMIS mandate is due to expire in January 2011. In addition, the upcoming national elections and 
South Sudan referendum ensure a volatile period ahead.  
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clarity will depend on oversight by a Review Board19 and revisions to the plan. Unless there is 
major political upheaval, the transition of responsibility from UNMAO to SSDA/C will occur in 
June/July 2011. By that time, UNMAO projects that all the high and medium impacted 
communities will be freed from the threats of mines/ERW. 
 
What is absent from this initial edition of the MYP are clear statements of consensus on: 
 the extent of likely contamination and, hence, the need for mine action services after 
the planned transition in mid-2011 
 the capacity requirements that will be required to meet those needs 
 GoSS plans for how those capacities should be organised (e.g. public sector; NGO; 
commercial) and financed 
 
Without additional clarity on such fundamental issues, it is difficult for DDG and other mine 
action operators to plan for the post-transition period. 
 
Textbox 1 – Lessons on the institutional make-up of mine action programmes 
IMAS 02.10: Establishment of a Mine Action Programme suggests that a programme should 
comprise: 
 
 A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) – the policy-making organ: usually, an inter-
ministerial committee with members drawn from (i) ministries responsible for the 
mine action pillars (e.g. Defence for stockpile destruction; Education for MRE; Health 
and Social Welfare for VA; Foreign Affairs for treaty processes), (ii) ministries whose 
work programmes are affected by mine/ERW contamination (e.g. Transport; Power; 
Agriculture), and (iii) core economic management functions (budget and planning) 
 A national Mine Action Centre (MAC) – responsible for implementing the policy 
including operations planning and coordination, national mine action database, 
quality management, etc. 
 Operators delivering mine action services (demining; MRE; VA) 
 
Since the publication in 1997 of an important UN study on building indigenous capacities for 
mine action, the conventional wisdom within the international mine action community is that 
the MAC should not have its own capacity for delivery of mine action services; rather, 
operators should be independent NGOs, firms or public agencies.  
 
International experience shows, however, that many successful programmes do not adhere to 
conventional wisdom. Azerbaijan, Ethiopia and Yemen all have effective mine action 
programmes and, in each case, the MAC is also the sole or principal demining operator. These 
successful programmes all share a common feature: the integrated MAC/operator (ANAMA, 
EMAO, and YEMAC respectively) is under a strong board/NMAA. The board makes it clear that 
mine action is a priority and that good performance is required. The separation between the 
NMAA and the MAC is critical; not the separation between the MAC and the national operator. 
 
What model will South Sudan adopt? Currently, SSDA/C functions as an integrated NMAA and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
18
 For example, the MYP outlines $37.6 million in MRE projects for 2009-11, indicating the absence of a mechanism 
to set priorities within a realistic resource envelope. 
19
 This is to meet quarterly, co-chaired by the Director Mine Action (UNMAO), Director NMAC and Director SSDA. 
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MAC. This has not been a problem to date as UNMAO has the de facto MAC role. After mid-
2011 however, the current SSDA/C structure could be a problem – we are unaware of an 
example of an effective national programme in which there is not a clear separation between 
the NMAA and the MAC. The potential for failure would be increased substantially if SSDA/C 
also tried to assume the role of the national operator. 
 
International experience suggests one of the following models would be preferred relative to 
the existing SSDA/C: 
 
 SSDA/C as the NMAA, with a new organisation as a MAC and a separate national 
operator 
 SSDA/C as the NMAA, with a new organisation serving as both the MAC and national 
operator 
 
The DDG Mine Action Programme 
Strategy  
DDG began operations in South Sudan during 2006 with funding via UNHCR. Its efforts were to 
facilitate the return of refugees, mainly in the returnee corridors of Central and Eastern 
Equatoria. Prior to Sida’s agreement to provide support, DDG received funding from UNHCR, 
the Netherlands, Canada, Austria and ECHO. DDG consciously took a community-centred 
approach, with priorities defined in a participatory manner, in contrast to most other mine 
action operations which are tasked by UNMAO to focus on road verification and other 
priorities defined by the UNMIS mission and national authorities based in Juba. 
 
The same year it approached Sida for funding, DDG formulated a Strategic Plan for its 
programme in South Sudan (Strategic Planning Document: Year 2008/11). The vision 
articulated was “To be the preferred implementing partner in South Sudan for agencies 
involved in returnee support and reintegration, and humanitarian development agencies after 
the early recovery period.” The programme’s overall objective was “Creating an environment 
free of the threat of landmines and ERW, where people can live safely and have access to land 
and natural resources.” The Plan outlined six specific objectives: 
Table 3 – Specific Objectives from the DDG Strategic Planning Document: 2008-11 
1. An expansion of the operational area to 
cover 1-2 new states whilst continuing to 
consolidate activities within existing areas. 
2. Investigate the feasibility of involvement 
in SALW advocacy and activities. 
3. Improve HR management to retain 
qualified national and expatriate staff, and to 
identify national staff for management 
capacity building. 
4. Strengthen policy and programme 
development (including DDG’s HIV/AIDS 
policy and its Impact Monitoring System) 
5. Strengthen ties to SSDC and potential 
national NGO partners through capacity 
building and advocacy 
6. Cooperation with DRC Sudan 
 
The specific objectives of the strategy remain relevant but, over time, the flow of refugees has 
shrunk to a situation where, today, there are few refugees and a limited number of IDPs 
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returning to their home locations. This focus on returnees no longer reflects the current 
situation in South Sudan. 
 
Although the vision in the strategy document has not changed, DDG has recognised the 
changing needs of the country and has made changes to maintain relevancy at the operations 
level. 
Nature of Operations 
DDG has sought to establish a unique position within the South Sudan mine action programme 
by basing its operations on mobile and flexible Survey/EOD and MRE teams. It delivers the 
following services: 
 
Survey and marking – Confirming ERW contamination and marking of dangerous areas (DA), 
with the information submitted to UNMAO for entry into the Information Management 
System Mine Action (IMSMA) database. 
 
EOD disposal – Immediate Spot Clearance of UXO reported by the community or identified 
through community liaison (CL) and survey processes. 
 
Community Liaison – introducing DDG and its work to the community and facilitating the 
exchange of information between communities and DDG. 
  
MRE – providing knowledge and information to returnees and communities to mitigate the 
threat of mines and ERW and change risk creating attitudes and behaviour. 
 
Coordination – Close cooperation and information sharing with UNMAO and the SSDA/C.  
 
In addition, DDG originally envisaged the following services: 
  
Mine clearance – Few minefields exist in the areas of operations and UNMAO can task other 
operators, with more appropriate equipment and structures for such clearance tasks. 
 
Impact monitoring – Baseline and monitoring surveys to assess the impact on the returnees, 
communities and humanitarian partner agencies. Baseline surveys have been conducted for 
sites where work was conducted in 2009 and 2010. Some follow-up monitoring surveys have 
been conducted, but the system is not fully in place. 
 
In its proposal to Sida, DDG specified project objectives in line with its overall programme 
objective; basically, a reduction in the threat poses by ERW via (i) better information about the 
threat and (ii) removal of ERW. It specified the following expected outputs: 
 
1. General Mine Action assessments to identify community mine action needs and priorities 
2. ERW threats as prioritised by the community are removed through EOD operations 
3. Risk taking behaviour is changed and immediate threats are mitigated by the delivery of 
MRE 
4. Coordination between all stakeholders is maintained and enhanced 
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Areas of operations 
DDG has been operating in Eastern Equatoria, with Magwi designated as a high priority county, 
in large part because high numbers of returnees were expected. 
Textbox 2 – Mine/ERW impact in Magwi county 
According to the LIS, Magwi is one of the two most impacted counties in Eastern Equatoria, 
with two communities classified as high impact, seven medium and one low. Seven people 
were victims of landmines and UXO in Magwi in the 24 months prior the 2006 survey, 
representing 25% of the total number of victims in Eastern Equatoria. At the time of the LIS, 
Magwi County was expecting to receive 30,000 returnees – 60% of all returnees in the 
impacted communities in Eastern Equatoria. It is reasonable to conclude that the level of risk 
of being involved in a landmine and UXO incident would increase with the number of people 
returning. At the time of the LIS, only 30% of the 43 impacted communities reported receiving 
Mine Risk Education. (Source – LIS Sudan: Eastern Equatoria. Survey Action Centre/Mines 
Advisory Group, 2006) 
 
DDG has moved its site of operations several times in accordance with the tasks assigned, in 
line with access to sites during the rainy season and security threats from LRA, especially 
around Magwi and Loa. Having a tented field camp means that staff are easily moved 
according to changing needs and constraints.  
Organisation and staffing 
DDG has built an organisation in South Sudan that has been trained to a high standard and is 
fully accredited with UNMAO. National staff are evaluated to identify potential managers, 
supervisors and local technical advisors, and training is provided on DDG courses in Kenya and 
within Sudan. This enhancement of capacities at the individual level aims to reduce the need 
for international advisors over time (which will reduce costs) and provide sustainability once 
national authorities assume responsibility in 2011. 
 
The organisational structure of DDG as of the end of 2009 is shown at Figure 1. DDG has 76 
field personnel (plus a number of temporary personnel serving as guards, cleaners, etc.) split 
into two groupings, based in camps at Ganzi and Mundri respectively. The organisation has 
built a small but flexible capacity, which appears to be operationally suitable for the 
environment.  
EOD operations 
DDG has two 6-person EOD teams for spot task and two 10-person EOD teams for BAC. 
UNMAO appears to be good at utilising the assets of the operators in general and it recognises 
DDG capacities that are focussed on EOD spot tasks and EOD/BAC/Cluster weapons clearance. 
Recording and reporting mechanisms are very sound. These are still overseen by expatriate 
staff in the field (although this is increasingly taken on by national staff) and records are well 
organised in Juba. UNMAO and SSDC reporting requirements (the latter somewhat limited) are 
fulfilled beyond minimum requirements. 
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At present, UNMAO assigns DDG tasks that are considered priorities based on the data in the 
LIS and database.21 DDG also responds to direct requests from the communities for clearance 
of spot tasks  (and then reports these to UNMAO and SSDA/C). Given the nature of the threat 
posed by mines and UXO in Southern Sudan, any intervention targeting these threat can be 
seen as relevant to the needs (ensuring a safe environment) of the beneficiaries. Outside this 
basic prioritisation, DDG does not yet have its own monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems 
fully in place for determining the relevance of interventions. Baseline surveys have been 
conducted for all of the 2009 and 2010 work sites, but follow-up monitoring surveys have not 
yet been conducted. These have now started and, once in place, this monitoring will help 
document the socio-economic benefits stemming from DDG’s EOD operations and allow fine-
tuning of its prioritisation process. 
 
DDG has developed a niche in its capacity for cluster munitions clearance. UNMAO has 
embraced this to the extent that it assigns such tasks to DDG whenever possible.  
 
Since the inception of the programme, DDG has destroyed more than 300,000 items of ERW, 
about 96% of which is small arms ammunition (SAA). Although this represents potential 
                                                          
20
 This chart was provided by DDG to the evaluation team during the mission. 
21
 UNMAO uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). 
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threats removed, the figures do not necessarily demonstrate how significant the threat 
reduction has been.  
Table 4 – EOD Clearance Statistics 
EOD statistics 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
EOD Tasks Completed  15 52  212 210 489 
Tasks On-Going   0  28  36 NA 
m2  Cleared  74 21   0  66,346 66,441 
AP Mines Cleared  0 31  33 45 109 
AT Mines Cleared  0 12  9 8 29 
UXO Cleared  423 2,378  2,847 4,197 9,845 
SAA Cleared  3,354 32,093  195,151 60,955 291,553 
Total Items Cleared  3,777 34,594  198,040 65,205 301,616 
MRE operations 
The National Mine Action Strategic Framework for Sudan commits the Sudan Mine Action 
Programme to: “Provide Mine Risk Education (MRE) to communities at risk on priority basis.” 
UNICEF is the UN focal point for MRE and heads the MRE Working Group (MREWG), which 
brings together practitioners to coordinate activities. The MREWG meets approximately every 
two months and is attended by the DDG Community Liaison Manager.  
 
DDG has three MRE teams, all of which receive updated information from the community 
about UXO threats – an important feedback process – and provide mine risk information to 
communities.  DDG reports show that, between 2007 and 2009, a total of 602 MRE training 
sessions were given, almost 54,000 people were provided with MRE and over 39,000 leaflets 
were handed out. In addition, 1,411 community volunteers were trained. It should be noted 
that the mechanism for recording such statistics – without recording participant names – 
means the results could be misinterpreted. 
 
The evaluation team visited two MRE sessions during the field mission. Each session lasted 
approximately 1½ hours and was facilitated by two MRE trainers (mixed sex) and a team 
leader, overseen by a supervisor. Each session had around 30 community participants of mixed 
ages and with an approximately equal number of male and female participants. The MRE 
training focused on an animated presentation with posters, discussion with the participants 
and one role play. The training materials were satisfactory but the overall methodology could 
be altered to improve the potential effectiveness of the training with the use of standard 
methodologies. (See the recommendations at the end of the report.) 
 
The evaluation team saw MRE posters from DDG and other mine action agencies in most of 
the local administrative offices, and information such as booklets in the schools. Even though 
the impact of this is not being measured, there seems to be a high level of awareness within 
the communities of the risk of mines and UXO.  
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The evaluation team held focus group discussions with women who attended the training in 
Kagwada. While visiting Magwi and Pageri, the evaluation interviewed volunteer MRE trainers, 
the Head and Deputy Head teachers of Magwi secondary and primary schools where DDG 
provided MRE training, and seven pupils (both girls and boys) who had received MRE.  
 
The effectiveness of the MRE depends somewhat the replication of sessions within the 
community. To promote this, as well as sustainability, DDG recruits MRE volunteers in each 
community. Volunteers are provided with a photo-book, “Talk before you walk”22 – a portable 
version the MRE group training material.  
 
The concept of using volunteers to continue the MRE education is sound in theory, but 
appears relatively unstable in practice. There are several areas that might be improved. It is 
essential that volunteers fully understand the MRE material themselves, as well as having the 
capacity to inform and educate others, but the 5 – 10 minutes extra training they receive 
following the community MRE session is insufficient to achieve this.  
 
As well, there currently is no mechanism to assess the competence of the volunteers.  The 
volunteers interviewed appeared capable and keen but, that said, after a year of volunteering 
they had begun to feel less motivated and, effectively, had stopped proactive MRE training. 
Two reasons were given: one being difficulty with transport and the other lack of incentive.  
DDG does not pay or reward its MRE volunteers. This is a sound principle, but the result is that 
the volunteers feel they are not being sufficiently supported.  
 
The IMAS best practice guidebook on MRE monitoring23 states that "To date… MRE projects 
and programmes have not been particularly good at identifying, monitoring and reporting 
against indicators of impact. More often, programmes have chosen to measure success against 
indicators of process or efficiency ….since these are much easier to identify and determine.” The 
indicators in the LFA for the DDG MRE programme are precisely these process/efficiency 
indicators. The absence of qualitative indicators makes it is difficult to assess the effectiveness 
of MRE in achieving the desired outcome – changing risk taking behaviour.  
 
The IMAS guidebook also states that having baseline data on knowledge and attitudes to 
mines and ERW is a valuable tool in ensuring that evaluations can be carried out successfully.24 
However, there was no evidence that baseline data on current knowledge and practice 
regarding mine risk within DDG’s communities has been collected. This, combined with lack of 
indicators on MRE quality, means it is impossible to measure the effectiveness of the training. 
The evaluation team suggests that the DDG work with its MRE teams to identify suitable 
indicators and develop a method for assessing the effectiveness of their activities. One idea 
could be to design a short questionnaire on mine risk knowledge and practice and use this to 
interview a sample of MRE participants before, immediately following, and again a few months 
after the training. This would provide an assessment of retention of the MRE information and 
help identify changes in behaviour.  It will also be valuable for DDG to know the approximate 
coverage (e.g. percentage of community members) of MRE training.  
                                                          
22
 This booklet was originally developed by MAG and, subsequently, adopted by DDG. 
23 IMAS Mine Risk Education Best Practice Guidebook 7 (2005) – Monitoring, Section 4.5 Indicators. 
24 IMAS Mine Risk Education Best Practice Guidebook 1 (2005) 
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Support to capacity development 
Three senior staff members are currently supported on distance learning courses at the 
diploma level. These are appropriate to their positions. Five other staff were previously 
supported on distance learning courses. Staff are encouraged to obtain technical qualifications 
and there are now eight staff members qualified to the EOD level 3 level who have been 
trained on courses run internally and externally by DDG. A former EOD level 3 operator has 
been promoted to an EOD supervisor. This has removed the requirement for one expatriate 
and DDG plans to develop and promote another qualified Sudanese to the supervisor level, 
enabling the withdrawal of an additional international by the end of 2010.  
 
The MRE capacity of the programme was fully nationalised more than a year ago and is 
operating under the guidance of a well qualified member of staff.25  
 
Support externally has taken several forms: 
 Training support:  DDG and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) established an informal 
partnership to implement an EOD level 3 technician course.  This was administered by 
NPA at its camp in Yei, and DDG provided a chief instructor and some logistical 
support.  The course successfully trained 16 national staff, from five different 
organisations, as EOD technicians.  
 Support to national NGOs:  DDG has provided direct support to, and have an MoU 
with, a national NGO – the Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS). As well as 
having provided direct training support, DDG has had SIMAS staff seconded to its 
operations on a number of occasions for on-the-job training. 
 Support to national authorities.  DDG has provided significant support to SSDC in the 
form of places on courses as well as secondments from SSDC to DDG operational 
activities.  SSDC has welcomed this support. 
Linking with other stakeholders 
The evaluation team met several INGOs, focussing on those operating in the same areas as 
DDG.  These meetings provided a basic idea of DDG’s relationships with humanitarian/ 
development NGOs, but due to time constraints and the availability of INGO representatives at 
short notice it was not as full an enquiry as the team would have liked. In general, the NGOs 
are aware of DDG’s work, although some thought that DDG undertakes minefield clearance as 
well as UXO clearance. Many NGOs said they would like to have more information on MRE, 
both for the security of their own field staff and to disseminate along with other educational 
material in their awareness raising programmes (HIV/AIDS, nutrition, etc). The NGOs stated 
that closer collaboration with mine agencies, including DDG, would help achieve this. 
Monitoring of the programme 
There have been two formal monitoring missions undertaken by DDG headquarters, in 
November 2008 and September 2009. In addition, a programme visit was undertaken by the 
(global) DDG Chief Technical Advisor in September 2009 (this did not overlap with the 
monitoring mission). The technical visit was focussed on technical matters and did not identify 
any major issues. This coincides with the views of the evaluation team. 
                                                          
25
 The evaluation team had the impression that this individual has not been pro-active in introducing changes to 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of MRE services, but did not have time to either confirm this or determine 
why this was the case – more encouragement/oversight by the Programme Manager might well lead to 
improvement. 
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4.  Conclusions  
Relevance 
Has the choice of focus areas for the project been relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries? 
Regarding geographic focus, it is clear from the data available that Central and Eastern 
Equatoria are the most heavily impacted states in Southern Sudan. 
 
When DDG began using Sida funds in 2008, the focus was very much on returning refugees, 
and DDG based its operations along key corridors and in communities with high numbers of 
returnees. Over time, refugee returns have diminished to a trickle and the operational focus 
has shifted toward IDP movements and communities with high numbers of returned refugees 
and IDPs.  
 
In terms of thematic focus, DDG’s decision to concentrate on EOD and MRE is valid. Although 
difficult to quantify, DDG’s role in releasing resources and ensuring safety is appreciated by the 
communities. However, the low level of development in south Sudan means that communities 
have many needs and priorities. In some cases, there is a reverse flow of returnees from 
Eastern Equatoria to neighbouring countries or states due to the lack of basic services in most 
parts of the state. The trend is currently low, but it was recognized that these flows could 
increase if the situation did not improve in parts of the state.26 Although EOD support will 
resolve some of these problems by increasing access to those resources that do exist, South 
Sudan still has a long way to go on the road to recovery. 
 
The evaluation team also considers DDG’s ability to carry out spot task clearance on recently 
resettled land to be a relevant response to the current and future needs of the beneficiaries in 
areas of operation.  
 
As far as general MRE goes, about half the estimated 100,000 refugees returned to Magwi 
Country, and the majority of IDPs, are spontaneous returnees27 who receive no support from 
the UNHCR or IOM and little or no information about the UXO and mine risk. From 
observations along the Kit to Magwi road, some households are also establishing themselves 
adjacent to un-cleared but identified minefields. This, together with the fact that UXO are 
being discovered regularly by returnees, means that the MRE programmes are playing, and will 
continue to play, a role in enabling people to manage the risk posed by mines and UXO. 
However, weaknesses in the monitoring system do not allow a clear understanding of how 
much benefit MRE actually provides to populations.  
 
To what extent has the support been a coherent and comprehensive response to the needs 
of the beneficiaries? 
By the time DDG began its operations, a number of other mine action INGOs (MAG, NPA and 
FSD) were already well established in South Sudan, in addition to a number of large 
commercial contracts issued by UNOPS and UNMAO. DDG’s strategy to use a small, responsive 
capacity with CL, MRE and EOD teams gives it a niche and is appropriate given the nature of 
the threat in Eastern Equatoria. 
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Ensuring the response to the needs of the beneficiaries is coherent and comprehensive is 
partly out of DDG’s hands, as UNMAO and the SSDC are responsible for the coordination of 
mine action agencies. Within its operational area, DDG addresses the needs of the 
beneficiaries in a coherent and comprehensive way by cooperating with the local authorities 
and being responsive to the priorities expressed by the communities. A specific example was 
the clearance of UXO stockpiles from the secondary school in Magwi, which allowed the Jesuit 
Refugee Service (JRS) to renovate and expand this property. The school now serves 400 pupils.  
 
Does the DDG programme strengthen and/or complement other national initiatives, or 
hinder them? 
While a number of firms and other NGOs provide mine action services in Sudan, the vast area 
to be covered, plus the fact that the DDG programme is modest in size and delivers responsive 
services, means it has a complementary niche role. In addition, DDG provides useful support to 
UNMAO (preferred operator for cluster munitions clearance) and the SSDA/C, including 
support to capacity development, which complements other initiatives.  
 
DDG also has provided limited training and capacity development support to SIMAS which has 
welcomed DDG’s contribution, although its original support was from FSD. As FSD no longer 
has independent operations in South Sudan, DDG complements FSD assistance by, for 
example, providing opportunities for on-the-job training.28  
 
What is the value added for DDG/Sida’s involvement in supporting a safe environment for 
the returnees in South Sudan? 
DDG’s involvement in refugee return was very relevant at the beginning of the project, but in 
the dynamic environment in South Sudan, the need for a shift in focus has become clear.  The 
work now supports communities in which there are significant numbers of returned refugees. 
 
The role that DDG has played within these communities has provided residents with a degree 
of additional security, plus greater peace of mind. Members of the communities expressed 
their satisfaction that DDG was able to respond (albeit to a modest degree) to their needs and 
provides risk reduction in several forms. 
Efficiency 
Broadly, efficiency can be assessed in terms of the achievement of output targets, which DDG 
has done.29 
Table 5 - DDG indicators 
Indicator (target) Achieved 
10 general mine action assessments are completed per month  
Clearance of ERW on a site by site basis to a minimum of 15 sites per month 
being dependent on the level of contamination discovered 
 
ERW contamination is reduced according to community needs and priorities  
Danger Areas that are unable to be cleared are marked  
All individuals in the communities visited, regardless of sex, have equal access 
to the benefits of mine clearance (including employment opportunities and 
 
                                                          
28
 In all the cases, changes to the nature of DDG assistance might strengthen/complement other initiatives more 
significantly. 
29
 For details, see DDG, Annual Interim Report to the Swedish International Development Agency covering Mar 2008 
to Feb 2009. 
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training) 
MRE is delivered to 20 communities per month  
MRE is delivered to 10,000 beneficiaries dependent on actual numbers of 
returnees 
  (but counting 
methodology is weak) 
All individuals in the communities visited at risk have access to culturally 
appropriate forms of MRE that specifically address those activities that put 
them at risk 
Partly 
Men and women have equal access to employment opportunities and 
benefits deriving from MRE initiatives 
Partly 
 
Have beneficiaries and key stakeholders been provided with information regarding ERW 
contamination as per DDG project proposal? 
The length of the MRE training session, at around 1½ hrs, was considered appropriate 
considering participants’ other commitments. However, the evaluation team felt that 
efficiency could be improved by holding more than one training session per day in 
communities that are close to the DDG field camp. To be flexible and to accommodate the 
time preference of the participants, MRE teams could hold a several smaller sessions at 
different times within the same community. Splitting the training into smaller groups, by 
gender and age, would give greater flexibility and would also allow training to be more tailored 
to the specific audience. As the names of the participants are not recorded, there currently is 
no way of knowing if multiple counting is taking place, so the use of “participants trained” as 
an indicator may not be very reliable.30  
 
The use of volunteers to pass on the mine risk message is a great opportunity that could be 
exploited further. The volunteers, if adequately trained and monitored, could broaden the 
MRE coverage (enhancing efficiency) and provide more effective community liaison. However, 
measuring the effectiveness of volunteers in passing on the MRE message (the multiplier 
effect) has not yet been carried out in a systematic way and the evaluation team had some 
concerns over the current level of effectiveness. 
 
Has an immediate reduction of the threat posed by ERW been achieved as per DDG project 
proposal?  
DDG’s areas of deployment have been along returnee corridors and, as such, it is likely that 
these areas were areas where the highest risk would have existed (hazards on the ground, 
together with the presence of relatively high numbers of people).  As such, the general 
locations of deployments would seem to be correct.  
  
Threat reduction is certainly achieved by the removal of ERW in and around communities, and 
DDG teams have removed significant amounts of this.  Threat reduction is also promoted 
through MRE, if it is effective. While community feedback is positive, the true benefits of MRE 
are always difficult to assess and DDG would need to enhance its monitoring system to provide 
a reliable basis for drawing a conclusion of the risk reduction achievements of MRE. 
 
Has coordination between all stakeholders been maintained and enhanced as per proposal? 
DDG’s project document has three indicators relating to coordination mechanisms: 
 DDG is represented at monthly SSDC/UNMAO coordination meetings 
                                                          
30
 There may well be a requirement for refresher training, but monitoring data should clarify how many people are 
participating in their first MRE session, and how many are repeating the training. 
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 Technical Working Groups relating to Survey, Clearance and MRE are attended by DDG 
technical staff 
 Liaison meetings with local authorities are held in all communities where MRE and 
Svy/EOD are active 
 
The achievement of these targets is out of DDG control to a degree. No coordinating meetings 
have been held by SSDC/UNMAO since early 2009, nor are there technical working groups for 
survey or clearance.  DDG does seem to have established strong, but informal, coordination 
with the majority of mine action stakeholders.  Within the context of a country with formal 
structures that do not work effectively, together with logistical difficulties, DDG has been 
effective in maintaining and promoting coordination. 
 
Concerning coordination with humanitarian and development actors, DDG could be more 
proactive by identifying and proposing specific areas for mutual support and collaboration. 
This is especially so with agencies present in DDG areas of operation: ADRA, ARC, GTZ and DED 
in Magwi, for example. 
 
Currently, the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) assumes the role 
of the registrar of the local organizations at the state level, and aspires to coordinate and 
facilitate the activities of community-based organisations (CBO).31  SSRRC organises regular 
monthly meetings between UN agencies, INGO and the CBOs. The SSRRC officer in Magwi 
stated that he was satisfied with the level of coordination between DDG and the SSRRC office. 
 
Has the operation been implemented in the best/suitable operational set up in order to be 
efficient? 
The implementation of the project has been well managed overall.  Although logistical 
constraints are significant in Sudan, access to the operating areas has improved markedly over 
the last two years, which has reduced the logistical and administrative burden. The team 
believes that more effective operations could result from broader distribution of the 
operational teams to allow a wider spread of assets and capacity.  This will require more 
reliance on local management capacities, but the team believes that DDG is capable of 
progress in this direction.  
 
On each MRE team, there currently are two facilitators and one team leader doing the actual 
training, and there is one MRE supervisor who monitors, takes notes and provides feedback. 
The current methodology used for MRE (posters and discussions) does not require three 
trainers to be present.  
 
How has the programme been monitored? Is the programme using lessons learned and 
adjusting/ developing where appropriate? 
Both monitoring missions from DDG headquarters were thorough and well documented, and 
identified a number of issues (relatively minor) to be addressed.  One item – the revision of the 
Strategic Planning Document to be completed by the end of 2009 – remains unaddressed but 
work on this has been rescheduled to mid-2010 based on the planned regional DDG meeting 
                                                          
31 Mapping/Capacity Assessment of Local Organizations involved in Community Driven Development/ 
Recovery (CDD/CDR) in Southern Sudan. (RIEP) State Annex Report Eastern Equatoria. UN-
HABITAT/UNDP May 25, 2009 
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and the arrival of a new programme manager in February 2010. In the opinion of the 
evaluation team, this is a sensible decision.  
 
One area where the programme falls short is in quality management, particularly with respect 
to socio-economic outcomes from MRE and EOD operations. This has proved to be a difficult 
challenge for mine action in general. DDG has started implementing baseline surveys of all 
work sites and has plans for follow-up monitoring surveys, which the evaluation team strongly 
endorses.  The comparison of ‘before and after’ data will provide DDG with a much firmer 
basis for determining the nature and scale of services required, setting task priorities, and 
documenting achievements for donors, the GoSS, etc.  
 
Have the strategies and approaches adopted been timely in line with the needs and 
priorities of the beneficiaries? 
DDG uses participatory approaches, which is a sound strategy for ensuring its services respond 
to the needs actually expressed by community members. Community feedback obtained by 
the evaluation team was certainly positive, with some concrete examples of how DDG 
addressed community priorities. In addition to BAC tasks, DDG has a policy of setting aside at 
least one day a week for EOD spot task clearance, and this was praised by many community 
members during the evaluation. 
Effectiveness 
 
How have returnees and their communities benefited from the project? 
Clearly returnees and their communities have benefited by the risk reduction afforded by EOD 
survey, marking and clearance. They also enjoy a greater sense of security because of the MRE 
provided, although quantifying the actual risk reduction benefit from MRE would require a 
more sophisticated (and costly) approach to assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour.  
 
How have humanitarian organisations and their staff benefited from the project? 
Humanitarian organisations and their staff have also benefited by the risk reduction afforded 
by EOD survey, marking and clearance. Representatives from humanitarian and development 
NGOs were aware of DDG activities in a general sense, but not in any detail. These 
representatives suggested they would appreciate more support (e.g. MRE training for their 
staff) and collaboration, and the evaluation team believes that DDG might do more in this 
regard, particularly as the incoming manager has extensive experience working with INGOs in 
South Sudan. 
 
What has the project achieved in terms of capacity development? 
The project appears to have given greater emphasis to capacity development over time. DDG 
has provided good training to its national staff with potential and motivation, and has 
promoted those who have been accredited to supervisory levels. As yet, little has been 
achieved in developing national staff to the point where they could be promoted to 
management positions. 
 
DDG has also supported staff development in both SSDA/C and, more recently, SIMAS. Efforts 
to date, however, have been limited to the development of individual capacities. 
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Textbox 3 – Individual, organisational and programme-wide capacities 
We can view capacity development in term of four levels: 
 individual – skills, knowledge and experience 
 organisational – an organisation’s capability with respect to critical functions (such as human 
resource management; financial management; operations management; etc.) and overall 
functioning (strategy; governance) 
 ‘network’ – the performance of each organisation in a sector, a province, a programme, etc. is 
in large part a function of the actions of the others in the network (sector; province; 
programme), so the capacity of the organisations to function in a coherent fashion to achieve 
common goals is important 
 society 
 
DDG has focused to date on support of individual capacities among its own staff and personnel from 
SSDA/C and SIMAS. In the future, they might also explore support for capacity development at higher 
levels, such as: 
 
 organisational – support to a critical functional capability in: 
o SSDA/C (e.g. quality management; information management)  
o SIMAS (e.g. EOD ‘fire brigade’ response teams; financial management; overall NGO 
management) 
o incubate a new national NGO from DDG’s existing programme 
 programme-wide – working with SSDA/C, formulate an implement a strategy for a programme-
wide approach to (for example): 
 EOD response teams (‘fire brigades’) 
 monitoring and evaluation – building on DDG’s impact monitoring system 
 
Have the strategies and approaches adopted been effective and adequate in line with the 
needs and priorities of the beneficiaries? 
 
Are the chosen methods and DDG strategy for South Sudan appropriate in the national 
context as well as for the objectives set in the programme? 
 
Has the operation been implemented in the best operational manner in order to meet the 
needs of the beneficiaries/stakeholders? 
 
The initial response – to establish a programme to support returning refugees – was in-line 
with the needs within South Sudan at the time, and implementation appears to have been 
effective in providing returnees a safer environment to which to return. More recently, this 
aspect of the strategy has become outdated, but the operational approach has been adapted 
by the programme managers and, in the view of the evaluation team, remains broadly in line 
with needs on-the-ground.  
 
The DDG strategy of community-centred operations that allow participation by community 
members is appropriate in the South Sudan context, and is inherently adaptable as needs 
evolve. The strategy of using relatively small CL, MRE, and Survey/EOD teams also means DDG 
has the flexibility to adjust to evolving priorities. 
 
The opinion of the community members and NGOs interviewed was that there needs to be a 
demining agency “on call” to deal with matters as they arise, and this may require DDG to 
return periodically to previous areas of operation. The same situation arises with MRE – 
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people need refresher training or new returnees need the initial training, and there remains a 
role for DDG in this. Keeping the MRE and EOD teams together in one camp is cost effective, 
but there may be a case for splitting the camp and the teams to allow the MRE and EOD teams 
greater flexibility. Requests for spot task clearance are becoming common and DDG is valued 
for its ability to respond in a timely manner. Beneficiary communities seem to have particularly 
high expectations regarding support from mine action organisations, which suggests they have 
been satisfied with the services provided to date. 
 
Has the programme been successful in mainstreaming cross cutting issues, such as gender? If 
not, why? 
Gender mainstreaming does not appear to have been successfully promoted by DDG in South 
Sudan, and the evaluation team could see no fundamental reason why this is so. The only 
element of the DDG programme where there appears to be a gender balance is in the MRE 
teams, where there is an equitable ratio of male and female members of staff. In the EOD/BAC 
teams, women are not represented. 
 
DDG set itself a target in its strategic plan to add one further EOD team and suggested that 
“The additional team will potentially consist of a majority of women and established in mid to 
late 2008.” This has not occurred. 
 
In terms of HIV/AIDS issues, the team was unable to find an internal policy (in Sudan) and staff 
did not seem to have any awareness of the issue. This is a concern given the amount of time 
the DDG teams spend in the field. The evaluation team was told that a policy on HIV/AIDS 
existed within headquarters. 
Sustainability, exit and transition planning 
Is the support provided institutionally and financially sustainable? 
Given the dynamic evolution of mine action in South Sudan, the DDG organisational structure 
and approach makes sense. However, DDG faces real issues relating to planning over the next 
18 months, which are likely to be turbulent. National elections, the referendum on Southern 
independence and the handover from UNMAO to SSDC are all scheduled to take place. These 
milestones will create threats as well as opportunities, and the evaluation team was 
unconvinced that all contingencies have been considered. The strategy review process (which 
is intended to address the recognised gaps in the current strategic plan) and the planning 
conference scheduled for mid-March will be a good opportunity to address these issues. 
 
While the capacity building element of the programme appears to have gone well, the focus 
has all been at middle management level and below. Support to SSDA/C has also focused on 
mid-level personnel. This work is commendable – and reflects the fact that personnel must 
develop their technical and supervisory skills before they would be suitable candidates for 
management positions – but it leaves the DDG programme exposed in terms of sustainability. 
Various options exist: integration into another NGO; integration into a governmental agency; 
formation of a national NGO, etc. – but there appears to have been only limited consideration 
of these options to date.  Now is the time when these issues need to be addressed, before the 
political and, possibly, operational maelstrom of the next 18 months. As well, the low levels of 
education that prevails in South Sudan means that it will take time to assist even highly 
motivated individuals to assume management responsibilities, so it is best to start the process 
as soon as is feasible. 
 
 
DDG Sida Evaluation: South Sudan 
 
24 | P a g e  
 
From a financial perspective, the level of expatriate staffing in the programme places a 
significant burden on the donors. Without this overhead, there are more options that could be 
considered. 
 
A closely related issue is whether to initiate support for broader organisational development in 
SSDA/C and, perhaps, a local NGO such as SIMAS. Undoubtedly, the absence of a national mine 
action strategy that clearly outlines a plan for after mid-2011 makes it risky for DDG (and the 
other mine action INGOs) to make their ‘strategic bets’ for transition: should they focus on 
SSDC and government operators, or does the GoSS envisage a continuing role for local NGOs 
or firms?  
 
Is DDG prepared for future risks from political or armed conflict? 
The risks extant in South Sudan at the moment are potentially significant. At a political level, 
the changes ongoing – elections and the referendum in particular – raise the not insignificant 
possibility of unrest over the next couple of years. In addition, at a lower level, tribal fighting, 
particularly in Jonglei, could spill over into other regions.  
 
From an operational perspective, DDG has detailed plans to take into account the possibilities 
of political and armed conflict. The organisation takes an essentially low-key, “soft” approach 
to risk management, but has good links with the local communities in which it operates. There 
has been one incident where DDG was required to relocate quickly due to the impending 
arrival of an LRA element; this appears to have been undertaken effectively and without loss. 
DDG is part of the “Comprehensive Juba plan,” which is co-ordinated by the NGO community 
and supports the evacuation of international staff should the need arise. 
 
Does DDG have realistic plans in place for exit and transition? 
On several issues such as exit/transition, DDG seems to be deferring decisions while awaiting 
the results of the political processes over the next 18 months. Current plans suggest waiting 
until the UNMAO-to-SSDA/C transition has taken place. The evaluation team does not believe 
this is an appropriate posture. We recommend a planning process should begin now to 
formulate options based on several conceivable scenarios over the next 18 months (i.e. 
contingency planning). We understand this issue was on the agenda for the DDG regional 
meetings, scheduled for 22-26 March in Nairobi. 
Coverage 
Which beneficiaries and groups have been included/ excluded from the project? 
There is no apparent exclusion on basis of ethnicity. In Magwi, DDG operates in both the Acholi 
and Madi corridors. In Kit, where at least two ethnic groups reside, DDG operates in both 
areas. DDG also recruits MRE volunteers from both communities.  
 
As well, there does not appear to be any exclusion in terms of gender: the evaluation team 
met both male and female MRE volunteers. MRE teams are representative of both sexes, and 
the ratio of participants appears to be approximately even. However, there may be issues 
related to timing for MRE training. Sessions are held for mixed groups. The timing for these 
training sessions may not be appropriate to women and this should be assessed.    
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The only group that reported exclusion was the disabled. In a meeting at Kagwada, a blind 
participant complained that DDG did not include him and other disabled members of the 
community.32  
Coordination 
Is DDG able to coordinate effectively in light of donor, liaison partner, and CSO actions? 
DDG is well regarded in the mine action community in South Sudan.  In terms of key 
stakeholders, its relationships with both SSDA/C and UNMAO are strong. 
 
The team felt that DDG’s relationships with donors, national authorities and the UN appeared 
well established and constructive. However, the team felt that DDG have been tightly focussed 
on delivering mine action services, and could improve its relationship and communications 
with CBO and non-mine action NGOs.  
 
                                                          
32
 The evaluation team did not observe MRE sessions targeted for children during the mission, nor see training 
materials appropriate for children. DDG has since confirmed that it does have MRE materials for children, and does 
deliver sessions aimed at children. 
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5.  Recommendations 
Recommendations for DDG 
DDG should: 
 
1. Revise its strategic plan to incorporate: 
 a focus on community security and development needs rather than the safe return of 
refugees 
 contingency plans or strategic options regarding transition/exit, each based on a 
potential scenario and depending on the outcomes of, at least: 
o the national election 
o the referendum on self-determination for South Sudan 
o the ending or prolongation of the UNMAO mandate in the South 
 a more ambitious plan to support the development of national capacities, going 
beyond individual capacities to include functional capabilities of partner organisations 
(e.g. quality management; financial management) or the national programme (e.g. 
national monitoring and evaluation systems) – see Textbox 3 – Individual, 
organisational and programme-wide capacities 
 options for enhancing its cost-effectiveness, which could entail 
o reducing the number of expatriate staff, or  
o achieving scale economies by broadening the geographic area of operations or 
scope economies by adding new services, such as SALW management for 
community security 
 
2. Fully implement its plans for monitoring and reporting on the developmental outcomes 
stemming, in whole or in part, from its services (i.e. baseline and post-completion 
monitoring surveys). 
 
3. Strengthen its coordination with development agencies. 
 
4. Address cross-cutting issues more thoroughly; in particular, gender & diversity, plus 
HIV/AIDS. 
 
6. Strengthen its MRE services by: 
 dividing participants into smaller groups based on age and gender, and building more 
role play into the training, particularly for groups with lower literacy 
 developing the MRE volunteer resource more effectively by thorough vetting of 
potential volunteers, a comprehensive training process, and regular monitoring and 
evaluation of volunteer activities 
 expanding the number of MRE sessions held in a day and the number of communities 
covered over a period of time 
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Recommendations for Sida 
Sida should: 
 
3. Maintain funding to DDG, assuming its project proposal adequately addresses the 
recommendations listed above, including the incorporation of a transition and exit 
strategy, at least with respect to the delivery of the existing range of MRE and EOD 
services. 
 
4. Work with other mine action donors to encourage UNMAO and SSDC to update the Multi-
Year Plan for the Mine Action Programme, which should incorporate clear statements on: 
 the projected extent and impact of the contamination that will remain as of mid-2011 
(i.e. the needs assessment) 
 the capacities that will be required to address the threat remaining after mid-2011, 
and  
 the GoSS vision and strategy for how those capacities will be financed and delivered, 
including the capacities required for: 
o making policy and strategy 
o operational planning and coordination 
o delivery of mine action services 
 
Textbox 1 – Lessons on the institutional make-up of mine action programmes has some 
additional information on why clarity on the GoSS vision and strategy for the organisational 
make-up of the national mine action programme is important to clarify in advance of the 
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In 2008, UNHCR estimated that approx 260.000 refugees were still living in exile and the number 
of registered IDPs were just below 487.000 (IOM, 2008). The exact number of spontaneous returns 
and resettlements is not known, but it is likely to add to the total number of displaced people South 
Sudan33. On 1 March 2008 Danish Demining Group (DDG) entered into a two-year agreement with 
the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) to implement the project “Survey, Explosive 
Ordinance Disposal (EOD) and Mine Risk Education in Southern Sudan”.  
 
Other donors during 2009 have been the Government of Netherlands (NG) and the UNDP/DFAIT 
Canada (GPSF) which have supported the programme, each with a mixture of operational, 
personnel and support costs. The periods and operational resources funded by each donor have 
been: 
 
Donor/capacity teams Remarks 
Sida EOD team 1,2, 3 
MRE team 1 
CL teams 1,2 
Project duration: 
1 Mar 2008- 
28 Feb 2010 
Netherlands EOD team 4 
MRE teams 2,3 
Project duration: 
1 Jan 2008- 
31 Dec 2011 
UNDP/GPSF EOD teams 1,2,3 
MRE teams 2,3 
Project duration: 
15 May-14 Jul 2009 
 
This short project duration allowed DDG to 
save expenses temporary on the other 
2 budgets. 
 
* In addition to this DDG entered into a 
direct partnership with GPSF the latter 
3 months of 2009 
 
The focus of the project is to support the repatriation process for refugees and IDPs in South 
Sudan. The intervention should provide a safe environment for the returnees and communities and 
facilitate the work of humanitarian organisations through EOD clearance and mitigating the threat 
posed by ERW (Explosive Remnants of War). Landmines and ERW pose a threat and level of 
uncertainty to returnees, existing local communities and the humanitarian organisations that are 
endeavouring to assist them in a return to a normal and safe existence. All three donors in 2009 
have been part of supporting this overall project focus. 
 
The project objectives are: 
 
Overall objective: To provide a safe environment for the returnees and the communities, and 
facilitate the work of humanitarian organisations. 
 
Specific objective: Provide beneficiaries and key stakeholders with improved information 
regarding ERW contamination and an immediate reduction of the threat posed by ERW to 
provide a safe environment for communities. 
 
                                                          
33 Annex A refers for further general context information 
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The Sida financed project period is ending in 2010 and Sida and DDG have discussed the 
possibility of a continuation of the project. It is in the interest of both parties to carry out the 
evaluation in order to acquire recommendations to inform this decision. Furthermore, both parties 
wish to evaluate the outcome and relevance of the project. 
 
To allow sufficient time for analysis of the evaluation findings Sida will consider providing a four 
month extension of the project, until 30 June 2010. 
 
2. Purpose of the evaluation  
The purpose of the evaluation is two-fold: 1) inform Sida’s and DDG’s decisions regarding a 
continuation of the project; 2) contribute to improving the programme through documenting lessons 
learned and providing recommendations 
  
The primary intended users of the evaluation will be Sida’s programme officers and strategic 
managers at Sida’s Sudan Team, Sida’s Human Security Policy Department and  DDG’s 
Programme Coordinator, the Programme Manager and the Danish Refugee Council Policy Unit. 
  
3. Evaluation objective 
The objective of the evaluation is to ascertain results (output and outcome) and assess the 
efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the project “Survey, Explosive Ordinance Disposal and 
Mine Risk Education, in Southern Sudan” with a specific focus on the Sida contribution.   
 
Specifically, the objective of the evaluation is to (i) summarise achievements, experiences and 
lessons on what might have affected the implementation of the project; and (ii) provide 
recommendations regarding possible future project strategies and approaches. 
 




The relevance of the project objectives and the logic behind them given the situation and needs of 
the beneficiaries.  
 
 Has the choice of focus areas for the project been relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries?  
 
 To what extent has the support been a coherent and comprehensive response to the needs of 
the beneficiaries? 
 
 Does the DDG programme strengthen and/or complement other national initiatives, or hinder 
them? 
 
 What is the value added for DDG / Sida’s involvement in supporting a safe environment for the 




The efficiency with which the project is translated into activities including financial and human 
resources, management, and monitoring and evaluation.  
 
                                                          
34
 For this exercise it is recommended to use the LFA produced in conjunction of the proposal from 2008. Outputs, outcomes and 
indicators can be used as benchmarks. DDG’s own Impact Monitoring system can naturally be used in connection with this – but no 
impact assessment have yet been implemented. Must be discussed with Sida and the consultant what is most appropriate. 
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 Have the strategies and approaches adopted been effective, timely and adequate in line with 
the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries?  
 
 Has the operation been implemented in the best / suitable operational set up in order to be 
efficient? 
 
 How has the programme been monitored? Is the programme using lessons learned and 




The effectiveness of the project in achieving the objectives set out, including choice of strategies 
and approaches.  
 
 To what extent has the project achieved the objectives set out? 
 
 Are the chosen methods and DDG strategy for South Sudan appropriate in the national 
context as well as for the objectives set in the programme? 
 
 Has the operation been implemented in the best operational manner in order to meet the 
needs of the beneficiaries / stakeholders?  
 
 Has the programme been successful in mainstreaming cross cutting issues, such as gender? 
If not, why? 
 
Other issues to be examined include: 
 
The sustainability of the support provided to the project. Is the support provided institutionally and 
financially sustainable? 
 
Coverage – which beneficiaries and groups have been included/excluded from the project?  
 
Coordination – the project cannot be evaluated in isolation from what others are doing, including 
donors, liaison partners and CSOs.  
 
5. Evaluation methodology 
a. Phase one: inception phase, desk review, discussions and interviews with Sida HQ 
and DDG HQ. Develop inception report.  
b. Phase two: Field visit to project sites in Southern Sudan 
c. Phase three: Evaluation report writing, dissemination and presentation of results 
 
6. Expected outputs: 
a. An evaluation inception report prepared and approved by Sida before commencing 
phase two. The inception report should state clearly who the intended users of the 
evaluation are, and how these will be involved in the evaluation process. It should 
also include a detailed description of the methodology and research strategy and 
analytical approach specifying how the analysis will be performed. A list of questions, 
description of sources of evidence, and data collection process and methods to be 
used should also be described in the inception report. A detailed work plan should be 
included in the inception report with key activities and plans for field work. For further 
guidance see Annex A. 
b. A debriefing workshop of preliminary findings and conclusions provided to DDG and 
Sida in Sudan at the end of field visit.  
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c. A written evaluation report of no more than 30 pages (excluding annexes) in line with 
to Sida’s reporting format35 submitted by 1 April 2010. The evaluation report should 
adhere to the DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.   
d. The recommendations in the report will aim to guide DDG in assessing future 
objectives, help in improving the design and implementation of the programme The 
recommendations to Sida should cover the whole spectrum of aid management, 
including resource allocation, financing, planning, implementation, and monitoring 
and evaluation. 
e. Presentation of findings and recommendations to Sida and DDG in April/May  
 
7. Responsibility and management of the evaluation-  
a. DDG Programme Coordinator, DDG HQ along with Programme Coordinator Sida, 
Stockholm 
b. The evaluation will be carried out by an independent and impartial consultant.  
c. The final approval of reports and any significant changes to the evaluation will be 
done by Sida 
 
 
8. Team and qualifications 
The consultant must not have been involved in the DDG Southern Sudan programme in any way. If 
there may be issues with regard to impartiality and conflict of interest, the consultant should clearly 
state so in the proposal submitted. 
 
The consultant should have the following qualifications: 
i. Broad and strong technical MA knowledge 
ii. Analytical skills 
iii. Strong experience in measure / value MA against socio-economic and 
broader context issues 
iv. Cultural and political sensitive 
v. Experience in reviews and evaluations, including interview skills 
vi. Excellent in English 
vii. Strong writing, communication and facilitation skills 
 
 
The consultants should prepare a proposal (incl. CV) indicating what approach and methodology 
they intend to use for the assignment, together with a work plan of activities, as well as budget, 
including proposed daily fee rate and reimbursable expenses (e.g. travel etc.).  
 
9. Timing  
Starting mid-January 2010. Desk review can be conducted earlier if required. Field work suggested 
implemented in weeks 5 and 6, 2010. 
 
10. Budget 
Pending consultant fee and anticipated cost. 
 
                                                          
35
 See for guidance Sida’s Evaluation Manual (http://www.sida.se/PageFiles/3736/SIDA3753en_Looking_back.pdf).  
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Appendix 2 – Evaluation Matrix: DDG South Sudan 
Question/Issue (question type) Possible indicators (otherwise 
comments) 
Sources of data (preliminary) Data collection methods 
The relevance of the project objectives and the logic behind them given the situation and needs of the beneficiaries 
Has the choice of focus areas for 
the project been relevant to the 
needs of the beneficiaries? 
(Descriptive) 
 Area priorities identified by 
UNHCR 
 Community impact scores 
 Requests from govt., NGOs etc. 
 UNHCR reports 
 LIS 
 Govt., NGOs etc. 
 Beneficiary views 
 Document review 
 Semi-structured interviews 
with representatives in 
South Sudan 
To what extent has the support 
been a coherent and 
comprehensive response to the 
needs of the beneficiaries? 
(Descriptive) 
Comment: Three levels of ‘needs’ to 
assess: (i) needs vis-à-vis explosive 
hazards; (ii) needs vis-à-vis productive 
use of unblocked assets; (iii) 
sustainable livelihoods needs more 
generally 
 DDG needs assessment 
reports 
 Needs assessments from 
UNHCR, other UN agencies 
and NGOs in South Sudan 
 LIS  
 Beneficiary views 
 Document review 
 Semi-structured interviews 
with representatives in 
South Sudan 
 Participatory community 
visits 
Does the DDG programme 
strengthen and/or complement 
other national initiatives, or 
hinder them? (Descriptive) 
 Overlaps (by area + service 
provided) 
 Numbers of humanitarian/ 
development agencies working in 
DDG areas 
 Mine action actors (SSDC, 
UNMAO, NPA, MAG, national 
NGOs) 
 Other actors (GoSS, UNHCR, 
Joint Donor Team, UNDP) 
 Document review 
 Semi-structured interviews 
with mine action actors 
 Semi-structured interviews 
with other actors 
What is the value added for 
DDG/Sida’s involvement in 
supporting a safe environment for 
the returnees in South Sudan? 
(Descriptive) 
 Areas covered/services provided 
by other mine action actors 
 Areas covered/services provided 
by humanitarian + development 
actors 
The efficiency with which the project is translated into activities including financial and human resources, management, and monitoring and 
evaluation 
Have beneficiaries and key 
stakeholders been provided with 
information regarding ERW 
contamination as per DDG project 
proposal? (Normative) 
 general mine action assessments 
completed (10/month) 
 MRE delivered (20 communities/ 
month) 
 No. of beneficiaries of MRE 
 DDG progress reports and 
monitoring mission reports 
 DDG staff 
 Beneficiary communities 
 SSDC/UNMAO 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
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Question/Issue (question type) Possible indicators (otherwise 
comments) 
Sources of data (preliminary) Data collection methods 
(10,000 dependent on numbers of 
returnees) 
 Delivery or culturally appropriate + 
targeted MRE.  
 Equal access to employment 
opportunities deriving from MRE 
initiatives 
Has an immediate reduction of 
the threat posed by ERW been 
achieved as per DDG project 
proposal? (Normative) 
 Clearance of ERW on a site by site 
basis to a minimum of 15 sites per 
month have been conducted 
(number depending on the level of 
contamination discovered) 
 ERW contamination is reduced 
according to the community needs 
and priorities 
 Danger areas that are unable to be 
cleared are marked 
 All individuals in the communities 
have been visited, regardless of 
sex, and have equal access to the 
benefits of mine clearance 
(including employment 
opportunities and training) 
 DDG progress reports and 
monitoring mission reports 
 DDG staff 
 Beneficiary communities 
 SSDC/UNMAO 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
Has coordination between all 
stakeholders been maintained 
and enhanced as per proposal? 
(Normative) 
 DDG is represented at monthly 
SSDC/UNMAO coordination 
meetings 
 Technical Working Groups relating 
to Survey, Clearance and MRE are 
attended by DDG technical staff 
 Liaison meetings with local 
authorities are held in all 
communities where MRE and 
 DDG progress reports and 
monitoring mission reports 
 DDG staff 
 Beneficiary communities 
 SSDC/UNMAO 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
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Question/Issue (question type) Possible indicators (otherwise 
comments) 
Sources of data (preliminary) Data collection methods 
Survey/MRE are active 
Has the operation been 
implemented in the best/suitable 
operational set up in order to be 
efficient? (Descriptive) 
 Operational structures of other 
operators 
 Unit costs (e.g. per deminer; per 
community) of other operators 
 DDG, other MA NGOs, 
SSDC/UNMAO 
 Document review 
 Review of findings from 
previous evaluations of 
other MA operators in 
South Sudan 
How has the programme been 
monitored? Is the programme 
using lessons learned and 
adjusting/ developing where 
appropriate? (Descriptive) 
 Frequency of monitoring visits  
 Frequency & quality of analytic 
reports based on impact data 
 Specific examples of adjustments 
introduced 
 DDG monitoring & impact 
monitoring reports 
 DDG Sudan management 
team 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
Have the strategies and 
approaches adopted been timely 
in line with the needs and 
priorities of the beneficiaries? 
(Descriptive) 
 Needs assessment  
 Frequency of monitoring visits  
 DDG strategies, needs 
assessment & monitoring 
reports 
 Beneficiary communities 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
The effectiveness of the project in achieving the objectives set out,36 including choice of strategies and approaches. 
How have returnees and their 
communities benefited from the 
project? (Descriptive) 
 Community EOD surveys 
conducted 
 Devices located + destroyed 
 Areas marked 
 Beneficiaries of MRE sessions 
 Reports of devices by beneficiaries 
to DDG or authorities 
 Community populations (former 
refugees; former IDP; total)  
 Lower ERW accident rate 
 Women, men, girls, boys know and 
avoid dangerous areas 
 DDG progress reports and 
monitoring mission reports 
 SSDC/UNMAO statistics 
 Beneficiary communities 
 UNHCR 
 Document review 
 Participatory community 
visits 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
 Observation 
                                                          
36
 The overall objective set-out in the Evaluation ToR differs from that in the original DDG proposal. We have used the version set-out in the ToR. 
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Question/Issue (question type) Possible indicators (otherwise 
comments) 
Sources of data (preliminary) Data collection methods 
How have humanitarian 
organisations and their staff 
benefited from the project? 
(Descriptive) 
 Survey/risk education tasks 
conducted at request of 
humanitarian organisations 
 DDG progress reports and 
monitoring mission reports 
 SSDC/UNMAO statistics 
 Humanitarian organisations 
operating in the project area 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
 Observation 
What has the project achieved in 
terms of capacity development? 
(Descriptive) 
 DDG staff trained 
 SIMAS staff trained 
 Level of training 





 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
 Observation 
Have the strategies and 
approaches adopted been 
effective and adequate in line 
with the needs and priorities of 
the beneficiaries? (Descriptive) 
 Needs assessment 
 Frequency of monitoring visits 
 
 DDG strategies, needs 
assessment & monitoring 
reports 
 Beneficiary communities 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
 Observation 
Are the chosen methods and DDG 
strategy for South Sudan 
appropriate in the national 
context as well as for the 
objectives set in the programme?   
(Descriptive) 
 Other MA NGOs use similar 
approaches and consider them 
successful  
 Project objectives have been 
achieved 
 SSDC/UNMAO consider the 
approaches successful 
 Beneficiary satisfaction 
 DDG strategy 
 SSDC/UNMAO 
 Other MA NGOs  
 Beneficiaries 
 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
 Observation 
Has the operation been 
implemented in the best 
operational manner in order to 
meet the needs of the 
beneficiaries/ stakeholders? 
(Descriptive) 
 Other MA NGOs use similar 
approaches and consider them 
successful  
 Project objectives have been 
achieved 
 SSDC/UNMAO consider the 
approaches successful 
 Beneficiary satisfaction 
 DDG 
 SSDC/UNMAO 
 Other MA NGOs 
 Beneficiaries  
 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
 Observation 
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Question/Issue (question type) Possible indicators (otherwise 
comments) 
Sources of data (preliminary) Data collection methods 
Has the programme been 
successful in mainstreaming cross 
cutting issues, such as gender? If 
not, why?   (Descriptive) 
 Male/female ratio in staffing 
 Male/female ratio in supervisory 
positions 
 Male/female ratio of trainees 
 DDG 
 Other MA NGOs 
 Other humanitarian NGOs 
 SSDC/UNMAO 
 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
 Observations 
Coverage – which beneficiaries and groups have been included/excluded from the project? 
Which beneficiaries and groups 
have been included/ excluded 
from the project? (Descriptive) 
 Ratio of impacted communities 
supported by DDG 
 Ratio of ethnic/livelihood groups 
assisted by DDG 
 Ratio of women surveyed/included 





 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
 Community visits 
Coordination (including donors, liaison partners and CSOs 
Is DDG able to coordinate 
effectively in light of donor, 
liaison partner, and CSO actions? 
(Descriptive) 
 DDG contingency plans 
 Meetings conducted 





 MA NGOs in South Sudan 
 Development NGOs in South 
Sudan 
 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
 
Other issues: (i) sustainability and (ii) exit and transition planning 
Is the support provided 
institutionally and financially 
sustainable? (Descriptive)  SSDC/UNMAO plans 
 Donor plans 
 
 DDG 
 Other MA NGOs 
 SSDC/UNMAO 
 Sida 
 Other donors to DDG South 
Sudan 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
 
DDG Sida Evaluation: South Sudan 
 
x | P a g e  
 
Question/Issue (question type) Possible indicators (otherwise 
comments) 
Sources of data (preliminary) Data collection methods 
Is DDG prepared for future risks 
from political or armed conflict? 
(Descriptive) 
 DDG has access to up-to-date 
security information for South 
Sudan 
 Contingency plans exist, including 
different possible scenarios 
 Suitable evacuation plans exist for 
international staff 
 DDG 
 UN security 
 Policy Research Institutes 
analysing Sudan and South 
Sudan 
 Other NGOs 
 
 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
 
Does DDG have realistic plans in 
place for exit and transition? 
 Status of exit/transition planning 
 Evidence of discussions with SSDC, 
SIMAS & other potential partners 
 DDG 
 SSDC & SIMAS 
 International Mine Action 
NGOs 
 Document review 
 Interviews (see column 
sources of data for details) 
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Appendix 3 – Interviewees 
Name Organization Title 
Chris Bath DDG Country Programme Manager, DDG 
Philip Sullivan DDG Operations Manager, DDG 
Geoff Wordley UNHCR Assistant Representative (Operations) 
Max Wenbo DDG Course Manager EOD course DDG/NPA 
Magnus Carlquist SIDA  
Jurkuc Barach Jurkuc SSDC Director 
Mark Connelly UNMAO QA Officer 
Justin Green DDG Technical Advisor 
“Baz” Jolly DDG Technical Advisor 
Caesar DDG  
Wani DDG  
John Sørbo NPA Technical Advisor to SSDC 
Max Wenbo DDG Chief Instructor EOD 3 course  
Charles Wani DDG MRE team 
 DDG  
Klaus Ljørring Pedersen DDG 
Desk Officer Horn of Africa & Armed Violence 
Reduction 
   
Beate Mueller-Grunewald DED Regional Coordinator 
Manfred van Eckert GTZ Country Director 
Atsu Andre Agbogan JRS Country Director 
Jack Bilal ADRA Magwi Programme Manager 
Awadia Ogillo ADRA Associate Country Director 
? ADRA Agriculture Coordinator 
Okumu Joseph ADRA Pageri 
Gertrude Kiai 
Ganji Vocational skills 
training centre  
   
Akileo Ribe Manase Kulipapa Boma Sub-chief 
Johnson Okello Magwi – Payam Administrator 
Jessica Achiro Kit Boma MRE volunteer – Kit 
Oyet Moses Magwi Payam MRE volunteer –Magwi 
 Magwi Secondary School Deputy Head Teacher 
 Magwi Primary School Head Teacher 
Pupils: 2 female, 1 male Magwi Secondary school  
Pupils: 2 female, 2 male Magwi Primary School  
Beranadino Yambayamba Pageri Payam Chief, Loa 
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Appendix 3 – 2009 SIDA budget 
Personnel  Budget 2009 
Expatriate   
International Staff salary  2,041,716.21 
Insurance international staff  96,645.41 
International travel  155,815.58 
R&R  322,156.45 
Uniforms international staff  21,738.51 
Training international staff  16,269.49 
Water etc international staff  48,684.63 
Total Expatriate  2,703,026.27 
   
National Staff   
Local Staff salary  1,507,214.21 
Insurance local staff  237,221.03 
Food allowance local staff  335,034.45 
Travel local staff  22,610.80 
Training local staff  90,352.40 
Total National Staff  2,192,432.88 
Total Personnel  4,895,459.16 
   
Operations   
Vehicle and Generator   
Rent vehicle and generator  0.00 
Insurance vehicle and generator  186,382.94 
Fuel  1,185,040.42 
Maintenance  1,307,678.63 
Total Vehicle and Generator  2,679,101.99 
   
Operations    
Communications  270,355.51 
Survey/EOD material  14,859.23 
Explosives  148,592.34 
EOD material  29,718.47 
Marking material  7,429.62 
Safety material  9,906.16 
First aid and medical material  17,335.77 
Uniforms  85,646.97 
Camp materials and others  33,680.93 
MRE materials  12,382.70 
IT  19,812.31 
Stationary  40,119.93 
Freight  37,148.09 
Other materials  74,296.17 
Compound  361,574.69 
Utilities  36,322.57 
Security  49,530.78 
Bank charges 1%  46,443.69 
Miscellaneous  24,765.39 
Total Operations other  1,319,921.32 
Total Operations  3,999,023.32 
   
Equipment   
Vehicles  74,296.17 
Communications equipment  10,624.35 
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Computer equipment  42,101.16 
EOD equipment  20,208.56 
Office equipment  23,114.36 
Protective equipment  0.00 
Medical equipment  0.00 
MRE equipment  0.00 
Camp equipment  66,041.04 
Total Equipment  236,385.65 
   
Other   
Monitoring and Evaluation  82,551.30 
Regional representation  12,382.70 
Workshop, seminars, international  49,530.78 
PR, marketing and visibility  10,318.91 
Auditing and legal advice  8,255.13 
Capacity building of local partner  41,275.65 
Total Other  204,314.47 
   
Administration   
Liability Insurance @ 1%  93,351.83 
   
Home administration   
HQ Salary and Joint expenses 5%  464,355.32 
HQ Reserve: 1,5% af adm. bidrag  7,071.40 
Total Home administration  471,426.72 
   
TOTAL COSTS  9,899,961.13 
 
